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Abstract 
 
The loss of friendship can be a frequent occurrence for children as they explore their social 
worlds and navigate their way through the demands of particular relationships. Given that 
friendship is a relationship of special regard, and associated with a particular partiality to our 
friends, the ending of friendship and the subsequent interactions between former friends, can 
be difficult areas for schools to deal with.  
 
Whilst there has been considerable research on the formation and maintenance of friendship, 
a consideration of what happens after friendship has had surprisingly limited attention. Much 
of our current understanding of issues on moral behaviour fails to fully address the positioning 
of former friends in our moral thinking particularly as regards matters arising from the priority 
of attachment.  
 
Recent empirical research seems to indicate that the memory of prior encounters has a far 
greater influence on future reciprocal exchanges (such as those found in friendship) than 
previously accepted. This paper considers suggests that this view of memory can be played 
out in two contrasting ways. First, a prudential view suggests that as our former friends were 
previously given access to our intimate secrets and confidences, self-interest would seem to 
indicate that we treat them well. Secondly, a residual duties view suggests that some 
obligations remain after the friendship has ended based on the history of the relationship. 
Finally, I then draw out some of the implications this may have for schools and the education 
of children. 
 
 
 
Key words: Friendship, special obligations, residual duties, former friends, priority of 
attachment. 
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After friendship 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The relationships we are in can make a difference to how we feel, how we act or how 
we justify our actions. Imagine someone passes your office, reporting that someone 
had collapsed in the building and was hurt. Your first response may be sympathy for 
a fellow human in distress: perhaps asking if they are all right, or if there is anything 
you can do to help, but you are unlikely to be moved to do anything beyond this (unless 
you are a first aider). Now swap the unknown person for your best friend: the chances 
are you would feel more concern and might immediately go to check on them. Now 
swap your best friend for someone who used to be your best friend: would that make 
a difference in your responses? You might go beyond just feelings of general 
sympathy but not go running to see if they were OK. Given that this person was once 
your best friend, that you had a deep enduring relationship of affection and mutual 
care at one point, how do you now situate the relationship within a discourse of 
partiality and obligations between persons emanating from special relationships? In a 
more philosophical vein: what (if anything) remains after friendship to justify treating a 
former friend differently to a stranger?  
Although there is a considerable literature on the formation and maintenance 
of friendship (for example Buhrmester and Furman, 1987, Selman, 1980) our 
understanding of what happens after friendship has had limited attention in both 
empirical and theoretical studies, let alone how schools might engage with the subject. 
Where research does exist in the literature specifically on former friendship, it tends to 
be mainly within the domain of antipathetic relationships or domains arising from 
‘hostile friendships’ (Card, 2007). This is curious in view of the fact that tracing former 
friendships, whether to catch up on their progress or reconnecting through reunions, 
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are increasingly common activities. The growth of social media sites such as Friends 
Reunited or Facebook have made such reconnecting with former friends easily 
achievable.  
Friendship undoubtedly has particular pertinence in the context of childhood. 
Psychology teaches us that most children ‘try on’ different friendships, particularly 
during the period of identity exploration in middle childhood and adolescence, thus 
experiencing a higher level of friendship change than adults. For very young children, 
this ‘loss of friendship’ can be a frequent occurrence (Bowlby, 1980, Bauminger et al., 
2008), often resulting in higher levels of vulnerability to the ensuing distress when the 
friendship ends.1 Adults who subsequently advise on conduct, whether as educators 
or as parents/carers, can often find this ‘churn’ of friendship bewildering in its 
frequency and often lack confidence as to how to discuss such matters. But the loss 
of friendship can have other repercussions: it can also entail the loss of the support 
systems created by the pair and it is this element in particular that I want to address.  
Whilst it is commonly accepted that we would do more for our friends than for 
others (the priority of attachment), I want to suggest that it may be helpful to enrich 
this critique: that in some circumstances, our understanding of the demands of 
particular attachments may need to consider the ties of former friends – those who 
stand at a midpoint between our current ties and those of strangers. More specifically, 
I seek to restore interest in the possibility of some element of ‘residual duties’ surviving 
the end of a friendship (Dixon, 1995) by drawing attention to the Aristotelian claim that 
                                                 
1 Indeed a wealth of empirical research has drawn links between terminated friendships and 
victimisation, bullying and malicious gossip between previous friends SNELL, P. A. & ENGLANDER, 
E. 2010. Cyberbullying victimization and behaviors among girls: applying research findings in the field. 
Journal of Social Sciences, 6, 510-514, BURMAN, M. 2004. Turbulent talk: Girls' making sense of 
violence. In: ALDER, C. & WORRALL, A. (eds.) Girls' violence: Myths and realities. New York: State 
University of New York Press. 
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we should treat our former friends well in memory of the intimacy we once shared 
(Aristotle NE, 1165b30-35).  
To achieve this, we first need to clarify the concept of ‘friendship’ itself and to 
distinguish the group we refer to as ‘former friends’. Then, the obvious next step would 
be to identify the problem of friendship within the context of competing ethical theories 
and to understand the challenge it poses for those theories. Following this exposition, 
we can then consider the ‘specialness’ of friendship within the discourse of special or 
negative obligations and role expectations. Drawing on rich recent empirical and 
philosophical literatures, I explore the role of memory and suggest two ways of 
conceptualising how some form of priority of attachment might survive amongst former 
friends: a prudential view and a residual duties view. Finally, these discussions then 
lay the foundations for drawing out ways in which this has implications for schools and 
the teaching of children.  
 
Understanding friendship 
The contemporary view of friendship often portrays it as a fairly loose relationship that 
lacks the formal structure and specific sets of rights and obligations associated with 
explicitly contractual relationships. The Aristotelian tradition, in which much of 
philosophical thinking on friendship is rooted, makes a good starting point from which 
to explore some of the more influential strands of thinking in this area in that it 
promotes friendship as a particular relationship associated with virtue or virtuous 
behaviour, as a vehicle for moral self-examination and/or a source of moral excellence 
(Aristotle NE). As no two friendships are exactly alike (each pair ‘negotiates’ their 
particular bond, choosing the level of their involvement in the life of the other), it can 
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be difficult to find a philosophical account of friendship that enjoys universal 
acceptance, yet there are broad areas accepted as particularly important.  
First, friendship is commonly agreed to entail a particular care and concern for 
each other’s well-being. This affection, whilst important in a friendship, cannot be seen 
as sufficient - it would be possible for two people to feel affection for each other and 
yet never to develop a friendship. Yet as Annis points out, it would be hard to imagine 
two people that claim to be friends who did not like each other at all (Annis, 1987). 
Secondly, friendship is action-generated – being friendly, actively trying to benefit the 
other and ‘good will’, a liking or loving emotional involvement in some way in the lives 
of each other (Aristotle NE, Pangle, 2003). It is this element that is often argued to 
place special demands on us in ways which are typically denied to those outside of 
the relationship: that friendship contains a “behavioural disposition to promote each 
other’s well-being” (Jeske, 1997, p. 53). Thirdly, there is the expectation that the bond 
(and the actions that support the bond) is reciprocated in some way (it is mutual). Both 
persons have to acknowledge the friendship; unlike love, which can be unrequited, 
friendship requires two. The final point to make here is that friendship is not instant: it 
takes time to enable the development of a ‘rich baggage’ of shared memories and 
experiences, as well as knowledge of the character and values of the other person 
that we associate with friendship (Stern-Gillet, 1995).  
Common experience teaches us that not all friendships can be enduring: our 
lives are too short to be able to devote the time needed to sustain all. This potentially 
leaves many lost friendships with people who at one time, were special to us. The 
former friends I specific want to consider here are those with whom we have previously 
experienced a very close friendship (‘best friendship’) and because we have been 
good friends in the past, we have spent time together, shared secrets and activities, 
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cared for and been cared about. Yet for some reason, the friendship has faded and 
we no longer do these things with them nor feel about them the same way. Here, the 
term 'former' acts as a modifier - we were friends but are so no longer. The friendships 
have lapsed, not necessarily completely ended for all time; these former friends have 
shared a past, but lack a ‘present’: it does not always block off a future or the possibility 
of friendship being revisited. Given that my primary interest is to draw attention to the 
positioning of these former friends in discourses of ‘priority of attachment’, the next 
step needed is to clarify why friendship is seen as problematic for moral theory. 
 
The problem of friendship 
The problem of friendship is usually voiced in terms of how we integrate the demands 
of friendship into our wider moral thinking. In a nutshell, if we have genuine reasons 
to treat friends differently to others, it would follow that some claims might be in tension 
with other claims of moral behaviour. So ingrained in our psyche is the belief that we 
owe more to those with whom we share particular relationships than we do to 
strangers, that we rarely view them as duties at all. This belief that friendship is a 
relationship of special regard, and that we owe more to our friends and hence should 
treat them better than non-friends, is considered to be common across many cultures 
(Bell and Coleman, 1999). Yet the preference found in friendship has also been 
accused of a particular injustice in that it argues for a partiality to our friends purely on 
the grounds that they are our friends and thus ignoring issues of need or desert.  
Arguments over this ‘priority of attachment’ and the import of claims for persons 
as moral agents have been well rehearsed in much of contemporary philosophical 
theory in recent years. Traditionally, this has resulted in numerous moves to view 
friendship as a basic moral relationship (Blum, 1980, White, 1999), to see personal 
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relationships as holding particular problems for Kantianism and consequentialism or 
even debates over the compatibility of some moral theories with the claims of 
friendship. The complexity of the debate surrounding this area can sometimes appear 
to represent a polarity of positions so diametrically opposed to each other as to be 
irreconcilable. For example, impartialist theories of obligation (such as that of Kant) 
purport that our entitlements and rights are not contingent on our roles or relationships 
to others. For instance, a strict consequentialist would argue that my friend’s well-
being should be no more or less intrinsically valuable than anyone else’s well-being. 
Just because someone stands in relationship to me as a friend, should not then imply 
that I should have special obligations to that person over and above obligations to 
people in general. The problem here, as philosophers such as Railton argue, is that 
being a friend entails acting out of concern for the friend in some way, thus seeking 
their good and not just the general good (Railton, 1984). A strict Aristotelian view, on 
the other hand, might argue that we should take special care of our friends because 
they are deserving of special concern by virtue of being a suitable object for such 
concern. The problem with this is that it would seem to leave us with no obligations to 
our ‘not-so-virtuous’ friends, which seems to contradict our commonsense experience 
of friendships. Others approach the problem by arguing that ‘special relationships’ are 
indeed the basis or grounds for legitimate expectations between those involved: that 
friendship requires a special kind of concern for our friends and a particular partiality 
towards those so positioned in our regard. In other words, the relationship itself 
demands that friends should promote each other’s well-being in ways greater than 
with those of strangers (have ‘priority of attachment’).  
 
The priority of attachment 
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Much of the recent philosophical interest in friendship frames it as a voluntary 
relationship, lacking a formal legal or contractual framework that specifically identifies 
particular ‘duties’ or ‘requirements’. To take just one example: consider the way in 
which family law reaches out beyond the creation of the family unit to address the 
obligations between members even after the relationship ends (divorce and 
maintenance settlements/division of goods/child access/inheritance etc). As there are 
no legally enforceable obligations put on friendship by the state, “any obligations arise 
from the parties themselves” (Rosenbury, 2007, 203). Friendships are clearly not as 
regulated as other personal relationships (such as marriage) hence any resulting 
commitments may be less obvious when they fail. Indeed, it is often claimed that part 
of what has value in friendship is precisely that it is not upheld by a variety of laws and 
regulations.  
A veritable mountain of philosophical literature has evolved through attempts to 
argue whether or not some personal relationships might contain within them particular 
moral obligations such that to be in that type of relationship requires a particular 
preference for those inside of the relationship over those who remain outside. Much 
of this has prompted philosophers to ask broad questions about the nature of the 
‘priority of attachment’, encompassing particular understandings that have yet to be 
fully or systematically explored.  
Few friendships have points at which the friends explicitly make promises or 
undertakings to each other, yet in entering into friendship we are somehow agreeing 
to something that is ‘joint’, sometime referred to as a ‘shared life’. Nehamas describes 
it thus: “Friendship, like every kind of love, is a commitment to the future, based on a 
promise of a better life together than either one of us can have alone” (Nehamas, 
2010, 278). Gilbert suggests that some commitments are best understood as ‘joint 
10 
 
commitments’  and as such “this type of order, in so far as it needs to be 'pronounced', 
need not be voiced” (Gilbert, 1999 149). Does friendship fit within this framework? 
Current understanding of a ‘joint commitment’ requires that both parties have to 
rescind it together – neither party can rescind it alone. Yet friendship can be rescinded 
by either individual without the knowledge or permission of the other, as can a ‘down-
grade’ from best friend to casual friend or acquaintance.  Richard White, nevertheless, 
argues that there is “still an implicit obligation that is an organic part of the relationship 
itself, and which would still be there even if it were not recognized by one or other of 
the friends” (White, 1999 81-2). Three interlinked literatures have evolved that may 
prove invaluable in thinking our way through the quagmire of arguments in this area: 
special obligations, negative duties and role expectations.  
 
Special obligations 
One branch of philosophical scholarship has traditionally argued that we may have 
‘special obligations’ to those with whom we stand in particular relationships or with 
whom we are tied. The obligations are ‘special’ as they are not to people in general -
they can only be held by those in that relationship. Nevertheless, such 
obligations/duties are assumed to be contingent to continuance of friendship: should 
the friendship end, these duties are considered to be cancelled. 
Philosophers such as Dworkin reject arguments claiming that just by belonging 
to a group, one assumes particular obligations as a member with ‘associative 
obligations’ (Dworkin, 1998, 196). As Dworkin points out, friendship does not form in 
a particular consensual act, but through: 
… a series of choices and events that are never seen, one by one, as carrying a 
commitment of that kind… We have friends to whom we owe obligations in virtue 
of a shared history, but it would be perverse to describe this as a history of 
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assuming obligations. On the contrary, it is a history of events and acts that attract 
obligations.                                                                  (Dworkin, 1998, 197) 
 
In a similar way, Telfer suggests that the mutual endorsement or consent to friendship 
becomes enshrined in shared practices over time – these define the commitment each 
makes to the other (Telfer, 1970). Being self-assumed, this can result in a limited 
shared understanding of what each will do for the other. 
Other philosophers, such as Stocker, point out that friends do not see their 
behaviour as being based on duty at all (Stocker, 1981). If there were no special 
obligations or duties between friends, we would have to claim that the duties we 
undertake to please our friends are neither more nor less other than the duties we 
have to all other people: what would differentiate them would be merely the opportunity 
to treat all the same way. This would mean that being a friend would not be a special 
reason for preference as such, but more an opportunity to exhibit the virtues we owe 
to all.  
 
Negative duties 
A further development of this argument has suggested that to become a friend with 
someone is to enter into an implicit agreement not to treat each other in particular 
ways. To be a friend with someone is to enter into an implicit agreement not to treat 
each other in distinctive ways and that some ways of behaving are considered morally 
incompatible with friendship. There is considerable philosophical precedent for taking 
such a stance: for example, Aristotle claimed that lying, cheating or deceiving are all 
somehow worse if done to a friend (Aristotle NE). This line of argument has notably 
been developed in the work of Cocking and Kennett, who suggest that friendship can 
serve more to exclude certain types of behaviour rather that to promote particular 
actions (Cocking and Kennett, 2000). In a similar vein, Hurka has argued that 
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alongside positive duties to promote the wellbeing of our friends are also found 
negative duties: that we also have duties not to hurt, lie or break promises to our 
friends going beyond those of duties to strangers (Hurka, 2013).  
 
Role expectations 
Scholars such as Hardimon consider whether our reasons to prioritise are social 
expectations drawn from the role itself, leading to arguments that such role obligations 
might be central to morality (Hardimon, 1994). Most social roles play out in a variety 
of ways: in my role as teacher, I may be advising, admonishing, praising, encouraging, 
evaluating amongst many other tasks, each of which depends on the context in which 
it arises. Many interactions are governed by the social conventions of the role: the 
doctor and patient; the employer and employee; the shop salesperson and the 
customer. Some of these interactions are codified as to the boundaries of legally 
enforced expectations for the interactions (for example, the interactions of employers 
and employees are subject to the respective employment laws); other interactions may 
have less formal codes of ethics governing behaviour.  
Particular role expectations often pertain to the way we expect people to 
behave, whether or not they follow the expected social norms for that role. It is 
undoubtedly true that having an expectation usually means we have reasons for the 
belief that things will go a certain way. These understandings of what it is to occupy 
the role often include assumptions of what others occupying that role would do. For 
example, we expect parents to do things for their child that we would not expect them 
to do for all other children: perhaps reading bedtime stories; intimate care giving etc. 
Whilst we may not explicitly promise particular actions or behaviours to our friends, it 
could be argued that friendship as a social role has particular elements - we expect 
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certain behaviours and attitudes from our friends as being symptomatic of that kind of 
relationship, but also includes my expectation of this particular person in that role.  
-------------------------- 
While there are arguably some flaws in this reiteration of the problem, I want to suggest 
the theoretical landscape becomes considerably blurred with applied in practice. 
Former friends can no longer be simply classified as friends (hence any expectations 
or obligations arising from a generalised ‘priority of attachment’ between the pair may 
no longer strictly apply), but they seem to be in a different category to those of 
complete strangers in that we knew (and loved) them once. Role obligations similarly 
offer little insight – there is no obvious identifiable social role of ‘being a former friend’.2 
So it is unclear then as to how we might explain, and later accommodate, our 
tendencies to differentiate between former friends and unknown others.  
 
After friendship 
Even if we accept that our friends are ‘special’ to us and thus deserving of better 
treatment than ‘non-friends’ from us, this does not automatically mean that they will 
remain special in our eyes for all time. In what follows, I want to suggest that there 
may be situations for some former friends in which the previous relationship ‘still 
counts for something’. Empirical research seems to suggest that we do indeed make 
such choices: that friendship dissolution is not always complete. Bowker, for example, 
suggests that some friendships can be subject to a ‘downgrade’,  evolving into a less 
close, less intimate relationship over time (Bowker, 2011). What is of interest here is 
that these downgraded friendships hold the possibility of a further ‘upgrade’ in the 
future. The overall picture that emerges is that there may be gradations of attachment 
                                                 
2 This does not, of course, rule out the possibility of there being one at a future date. 
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that survive some ‘downgrades’ and these may give good reasons to treat some 
former good friends differently to non-friends.  
Aristotle suggests that we should keep hold of the memory of the earlier intimacy 
beyond the dissolution of the friendship (Aristotle NE) and treat them well in memory 
of the intimacy we once shared: that friendship, being a form of love, requires us to 
treat our former friends better than strangers:  
Surely, he then, behave no otherwise towards him than he would if he had never 
been his friend? Surely he should keep a remembrance of their former intimacy, 
and as we think we ought to oblige friends rather than strangers, so to those who 
have been our friends we ought to make some allowance for our former friendship, 
when the breach has not been due to excess of wickedness” (Aristotle NE, 
1165b30-35)  
 
What should be noticed first is that friendship within the Ancient Greek world was a 
very different relationship to that which we are accustomed to today.3 It was seen as 
very much a public matter and as part of a wider interpretation of the concept of philia 
(Brunkhorst, 2005). These obligations of ‘friendship’, seen within a dense network of 
familial obligations and alliances of leading families of other cities (xenoi), could not 
only be inherited be passed on through the generations, could lapse and be 
reactivated, but the obligations and ties of loyalty that bound families together could 
override other obligations (Herman, 1987). Former friendships could literally oblige us 
to make allowance for the previous relationship. Given that we no longer operate within 
a framework of such ritualised friendship, this position involves complexities that need 
further clarity. Recent research into the role of memory in partiality is beginning to 
provide a serious attempt to restore interest in this area. 
 
The role of memory 
                                                 
3 I am indebted to Dr Oliver Belos for this reminder. 
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Recent research into the evolutionary origins of human friendship seems to suggest 
that reciprocal exchanges (such as those found in friendship) are far more dependent 
on memories of prior encounters than previously noted. Seyfarth and Cheney, on 
finding that several patterns seemed to recur across species, surmised that the best 
predictor of future engagements was a previous history of events, reciprocities and 
engagements (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2012). Learning from the experience of previous 
interactions, they argue, gives us a way of anticipating the future behaviour of the 
other. Sutton, on the other hand, suggests that memory “labels a diverse set of 
cognitive capacities by which we retain information and reconstruct past experiences, 
usually for present purposes” (Sutton, 2012), describing it as an important way in 
which our past experiences ‘animate’ our present actions.  
Friendship enables the development of the ‘rich baggage’ of shared memories 
and experiences, as well as knowledge of the other person, which may not be entirely 
lost should the relationship fade or end.  These memories are often impregnated with 
emotions, connecting our present self with our past experiences and actions in some 
way. In remembering an event, we often call to mind particular images: the picnic in 
the park with friends; the first conference paper given; the death of a parent. These 
memories of past relationships, and the emotions generated by the memories, are 
available to us in a way that is not available with strangers, thus we may be more likely 
to embrace the predictable regularities of former friendships. After all, the argument 
goes, with former friends, we knew them once: we knew their character and had loved 
and trusted them.  
However, we can often be unaware of the selective (and inaccurate) nature of 
memory. Most cognitive and developmental psychologists have long accepted that 
memory is fallible: the things we choose not to remember, the ‘gaps’ in our 
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recollections, the asymmetry in which two people can remember the same event. 
Whilst we may indeed be referencing or drawing on a past history of events with our 
former friends that leads us to trust in and anticipate the future actions of our friends, 
we also need to caution against over-reliance on particular recalled memories alone. 
First, there might be some unfavourable history with the former friend that led to the 
demise of the friendship, in which case we may look backwards with the proverbial 
rose-tinted glasses, mis-remember what swines they were, how they made us 
miserable, and fail to recognise that we had good reason to abandon the relationship. 
Secondly, just as easily as mis-remembering, we can also forget events or be selective 
of memories. Thirdly, and most importantly, to see friendship purely in terms of 
reciprocal exchanges seems to misunderstand the nature of friendship itself: 
friendship ‘support’ is not dependent on a build up of previous debts from one to the 
other. Unlike favours between persons, in friendship these are not on a ‘tit-for-tat’ 
basis: doing a favour for a friend is just what friends do. So how might some form of 
priority of attachment survive amongst former friends?  
 
The prudential view 
At one end of the spectrum (let’s call this the prudential view) we might find those who 
caution that former friends are uniquely positioned (because of the former friendship) 
to place us in some form of ‘danger’ and thus become cautious in our treatment of 
them. If that friendship can be demonstrated through a mutual intimacy of privileged 
information not available to others (and that there is an expectation of confidentiality 
between friends not to disclose these confidences), if the friendship ends, that 
expectation may no longer hold and our secrets may then become common 
knowledge or used against us. Such a prudential view argues that given that our 
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former friends have access to our intimate secrets and confidences, self-interest would 
seem to indicate that we treat them well.  
Even young children will share secrets and confidences and, as many teachers 
will acknowledge, when friends fall out, it can be the breaking of these confidences 
and sharing of another's secrets that causes the most distress.4 Indeed, the breaking 
of confidences can even be a way of gaining access to a new group (a form of 
‘membership fee’ paid to demonstrate the shift in loyalties). But if our concern about 
how we treat former friends is solely based on the danger that the other may hurt us 
or break confidences, it seems unsatisfying on its own as a moral response, 
suggesting a deep self-centredness in our dealings with former friends. 
 
Residual duties 
At the other end of the spectrum we might find those who argue that not all 
expectations or obligations end with the friendship – that some might survive, albeit in 
adapted form. Dixon purports that he has good reason to prioritise his former friend 
over a stranger (all other things being equal) in that former friendships create extra 
moral ties that “are not precipitately dissolved by our unfortunate estrangement” 
(Dixon, 1995, 79). What these ‘residual duties’ might be is never explicitly drawn out 
by Dixon, but it may leave us with some ‘wriggle room’ to explore. It is worth stressing 
that Dixon does not suggest that all abandoned friendships should come with complete 
residual duties: indeed, he explicitly argues that these might diminish to zero if the 
friendship ended because of the unforgivable behaviour of the friend (Dixon, 1995).5 
                                                 
4 This plays out in increasingly problematic ways with the use of multiple technologies as the medium through 
which we socialise and maintain our friendships: from posting rumours seen by multiple others, to passing 
around abusive or humiliating messages via social media to ‘revenge porn’. 
5 A point also made by Aristotle NE 
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Similarly, he argues, any ‘residual ties’ would be far weaker than ties to current friends, 
given the numerous relationships we form and exit from during the course of our lives. 
This approach can be revisioned in the light of the research on memory cited 
earlier. First, our former friend was a person who we saw as a ‘second self’ – we were 
deeply invested in one another; they were important to us and we cared deeply for 
their well-being to the extent we were willing to sacrifice some of our good to help them 
achieve their goals. Being a former friend indirectly references this history built up in 
the friendship and thus anything that may survive would undoubtedly have to depend 
on the nature of the history shared and on how it ended. Secondly, any ‘residue’ 
emanating from the previous friendship would have to come with a degree of 
proportionality: such ‘residual duties’ might persist after a reasonably short 
estrangement (hence we can sometimes pick up with friends we have not seen in 
some time, almost as if we have never been apart) but might dissipate completely after 
several decades. We may have valid reasons, underpinned by the ties and bonds of 
loyalty and affection found in friendship, to prioritise former friends over strangers in 
the first throes of friendship dissolution (during early downgrade), but there must come 
a time at which this fades into insignificance. In drifting further and further apart, we 
may find we owe them fewer duties and, over time, perhaps no ‘residual duties’ at all. 
This seems to suggest that there is a period of time during which we move from ‘having 
special obligations’ to ‘not having special obligations’ that may counterbalance the 
move in the opposite direction in the formation of friendship. 
Dixon clearly suggests that completely abandoning a former friendship as now 
counting for nothing at all would be to question the depth and authenticity of the 
previous friendship (Dixon, 1995). This, he argues, would be to devalue both persons, 
as both had previously invested of themselves in the friendship and would now be 
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disowning or ignoring that part of themselves the friendship may have contributed to 
forming. It is this element, I want to suggest, that gives us a starting point for how we 
might unpick the implications of this for schools.  
 
The role of schools 
School leaders and policy makers are undoubtedly beginning to pay more attention to 
issues of friendship, but not always for the most admirable of reasons. A plethora of 
recent governmental reports have highlighted social relationships as being crucial to 
improve the social well-being of pupils, who in turn achieve better academically in their 
readiness to learn and success criteria (for example DfE, 2015). In other words, 
positive relationships with others are acknowledged as having an enduring impact on 
future attainment. Whilst the attention given to peer relationships and friendships are, 
in the main, positive moves, the utilitarian reasoning used, connecting learning and 
positive peer interactions with higher standards, raise concerns that friendship then 
risks becoming seen as a ‘skill’ to be practiced and fine-tuned, which then risks missing 
the fundamental role it plays in our personal well-being.6 Indeed, the sheer volume of 
new directives to this end (the pragmatic appeal of market expediency), make it 
increasingly difficult to sustain a belief in the value of friendship in our everyday lives.  
Before proceeding further, it is important to note that I am not proposing a 
blueprint for practice here: it is not my intention to suggest ‘friendship lessons’, neither 
do I call for friendship to make a direct appearance on the school curriculum, not even 
for schools to develop even more policy documents. Schools are already responsible 
for much of the social and emotional development of their pupils, and all of the above 
                                                 
6 I am indebted to the anonymous reviewers for reminding me of this. 
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(except for the paperwork) are already in place in many ways.7  My contention is that 
‘after friendship’ requires reinterpreting and enacting these existing commitments and 
obligations beyond suggestions that schools should pay more attention to friendship 
or give caring support to children with their social development (both reasonable 
ideals).  
One way in which we can contribute towards a deeper understanding of the 
issues requires us to start from the fact that what happens after friendship is inevitably 
going to be bound up with the way in which it ends. After all, it is the aftermath of 
previously good friendships, those friendships that end badly, that research identifies 
as particularly problematic for schools. In some circumstances, the ill-will that each 
feels for the other might make being together, let alone revisiting the relationship, 
impossible. In which case, we may be quite justified as educators in separating 
‘frenemies’ as needed, at least whilst emotions ‘run high’.  
Many teachers still feel that actively promoting friendships goes beyond their 
professional responsibility (Hollingsworth and Buysse, 2009) and some can be 
hesitant on-lookers as friendships start to fade. This can at least partly be explained 
by the way in which friendship has become a private matter as a strictly voluntary 
relationship in which teachers feel reluctant to intrude. Whilst teachers believe that 
children’s social and emotional development is important, many believe they have 
limited influence. Yet there is much in their existing practice that already feeds into this 
area from dealing with disruption arising from difficult friendship endings to finding 
companionship for the lonely child on the playground. 
                                                 
7 For example, the obligations to promote the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils (SMSC) 
as outlined in section 78 of the Education Act (2002). 
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So what more can (or should) schools and teachers do? The following 
interlinked points may help us establish further ways in which we can support children 
with learning to live with former friends. First, social and emotional well-being is 
becoming well established in many schools in the UK as both a commitment and a 
priority. Subject content in areas such as PSHE is often seen as a way to address 
these difficult issues surrounding pupil well-being, in changing attitudes and 
dispositions and thus enabling children to live happier lives. Secondly, it seems 
reasonable to assume that many children enter school already forming ideas on a 
variety of issues and values including early friendships. Part of the role of the school 
has always been to build on and supplement the range of values that pupils enter with, 
supporting children in understanding and applying their growing sense of values 
(Halstead and Taylor, 2000). This includes their understanding of and value given to 
social relationships appropriate to their age and development. Thirdly, there is already 
a considerable empirical literature looking at ‘what works’ (for example, Ellis and 
Zarbatany, 2007, Proulx and Poulin, 2013, Weller, 2007), much of which considers the 
conditions needed for relationships to be sustained. All of the above suggest that 
schools actively valuing friendships, teaching children how best to sidestep minor 
conflicts, how to respond to transgression, or how to achieve reconciliation8 and 
encouraging children to behave with civility to former friends may all play a part in this.  
Psychology has long drawn links between the development of the emotions, 
socialisation and particular relationships (Denham, 1998), and if the research 
suggesting memory has a deep emotive aspect to it is justified, particularly when linked 
to the reciprocal exchanges found in friendship, this has to be carefully interpreted 
                                                 
8 Whilst there is the possibility of reconciliation between friends after friendship, this cannot be taken 
for granted; neither can it be insisted on. 
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within the realm of childhood. While we may expect most adults and many teenagers 
to behave with reasonable civility to former friends (even to those who may have hurt 
or abandoned them) learning to associate with basic moral respect for former friends 
may not be immediately achievable for young children in the same way. The shared 
memories and experiences that formed the basis of the friendship may not be as 
available to them, nor as easily understood or construed as with adults, and it is likely 
to be this element that children may need support with in order to develop the capacity 
to verbalise and reflect on their relationships.  
But we must also remember that schools are not the only agency influencing 
children in such issues; when it comes to young children, parents play a crucial role in 
supporting enduring relationships and attitudes to former friends. Family members 
undoubtedly influence friendship and peer social networks in such areas as 
availability, travel, arranging play-dates, all of which tend to affect children’s choices 
when young. Most parents learn to recognise that conflict and the ensuing break-ups 
between good friends can be temporary (that childhood friendships have an ‘ebb-and-
flow’ even in the best of them), and many wisely side-step such issues, concentrating 
on more positive ways of helping children to socially interact in supportive 
environments. Nevertheless, research is starting to identify ways in which parents and 
schools can work together to support the development of relationships. For example, 
Hollingsworth and Buysse (2009) found that parents of very young children (3-5 year 
olds) with developmental delay would support their child’s friendships by simple 
strategies such as talking specifically about the friend thus keeping the friend ‘in mind’ 
or directly greeting them in school. Teachers, for example, would promote friendship 
by setting up the social environment to help friends to interact, through careful choice 
of shared activities and the coaching of positive interactions. More complex strategies, 
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such as directly helping children to resolve conflict, giving children ideas on what or 
how to play, were used by both teachers and parents in the research with some 
success.  
Just as it takes time to build a friendship, it can also take time for a friendship 
to end. Short of those that end in conflict, many friendships that do not survive tend to 
slowly drift rather than atrophy. Not all ended friendships come with full residual duties 
to our former friends and these can fade over time; neither can all be reinvigorated 
(even for children) despite the pleas of parents or teachers to ‘make friends again’.  
 
Conclusion 
Whilst it is commonly accepted that we would do more for our friends than for others, 
I have argued that it may be helpful to enrich this critique: that our understanding of 
the demands of particular attachments need to expand to consider those who stand 
at a midpoint between our current ties and those of strangers. I now want to suggest 
that making such an allowance for a former friendship, keeping a remembrance of our 
former intimacy, reinforces and builds on commonly held views in philosophy of 
friendship in several different ways as intimated earlier.  
First, the lives of some persons do seem to be special to individuals in some 
way and to differing degrees, giving rise to reasons for partiality and it is not clear how 
any plausible moral framework could argue away from this in its entirety. For friendship 
to last, we need some sense of favouring those who are special to us. Indeed, many 
of these reasons to prioritise some might not exist (or be explained away) were it not 
for the existence of the relationship. Such obligations in some relationships may be 
cumulative over time, depending on both the individuals’ involvement in each other’s 
lives. But these obligations can fade over time as relationships are ‘downgraded’ 
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resulting in a limited partiality towards former friends. However, when it comes to the 
friendships of children, the cumulative partiality of friendship may be ‘truncated’ by the 
time-span of the friendship and the age of the child. Similarly, downgrades may be 
more likely as very young children ‘try on’ different friendships (See for example Ahn 
(2011)). 
Secondly, taking away the status of current friendship could still leave a layer 
of ‘affective care’9 that still has the appearance of duties and expectations. Care has 
an emotional aspect as well as a behavioural aspect and some emotional ties are not 
so easy to lose. While I may no longer actively seek to promote the well-being of my 
former friend in the way I previously might have done, I might still care what becomes 
of him or seek to protect him from harm in ways over and above that of strangers. In 
other words, we may wish them well more than we might someone we do not know, 
but we may not be so willing to sacrifice our own good as easily as we might within a 
current deep friendship. This gives us further good reason to promote the social 
education of children.  
Thirdly, much of social psychological theory suggests that friendships 
contribute in some way to who we are as a person and to who we may become. 
Indeed, a veritable mountain of research has amply demonstrated the importance of 
this in childhood. Some social relationships (such as friendship) undoubtedly strongly 
influence how we define and see ourselves; some of these past identities can linger 
on and still contribute to how we see ourselves now (Ebaugh, 1988). Whilst we can 
'unfriend' (for want of a better term) someone from our lives so that they are no longer 
part of our present or future, we cannot edit them entirely from our past. Encouraging 
                                                 
9 The behavioural disposition to promote each other’s well-being as described by Jeske 
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civil relationships with our estranged friends, being grateful for our former friendships 
and respecting differences then augment and enrich the school ethos.  
Finally, not all former friendships are the same: some will inevitably be closer 
in our affection than others will. Not all friendships survive in perpetuity - some may 
end badly; others may fade away, having run their course. Yet for a few, the former 
friendship may indeed generate reasons for treating the former friend more generously 
than complete strangers - depending on the depth and nature of the original friendship 
and the reasons for its demise. 
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